The impact of managerial quality on organizational performance: evidence from German soccer by Simmons, R & Frick, B
MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS
Manage. Decis. Econ. 29: 593–600 (2008)
Published online in Wiley InterScience
(www.interscience.wiley.com) DOI: 10.1002/mde.1431
The Impact of Managerial Quality on
Organizational Performance: Evidence from
German Soccer
Bernd Fricka and Robert Simmonsb,*
aUniversity of Paderborn, Paderborn, Germany
bLancaster University Management School, Lancaster, UK
In this paper we use a novel panel data set from the German premier soccer league
(Bundesliga) as a case to show how variations in managerial compensation impact positively
upon organizational (team) success. Using stochastic frontier analysis, we find that a team
that hires a better quality coach can expect to achieve a higher league points total by reducing
technical inefficiency. However, our results also suggest that the market for head coaches may
be allocatively inefficient in that coaches are paid below their marginal revenue
products. Copyright # 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
INTRODUCTION
This paper investigates technical and allocative
efficiency in a particular managerial market: the
market for soccer head coaches in the first division
of the Bundesliga, Germany’s professional soccer
league. Using stochastic production frontier ana-
lysis, we shall show that both coaching and playing
inputs contribute to team success in the league.
A substantial empirical literature has established a
positive correlation between spending on team
payrolls and team performances in European soccer
and major North American sports (Szymanski and
Smith, 1997; Szymanski and Kuypers, 1999; Szy-
manski, 2000; Hall et al., 2002; Berri and Jewell,
2004; Simmons and Forrest, 2004; Kahane, 2005).
The motivation for this relationship is that player
quality is easily observed and players are easily
traded, at least in European soccer. Given these
features of a competitive market, it is to be expected
that player salaries reflect marginal revenue pro-
ducts. Simmons and Forrest (2004) find that the
payroll–performance relationship is both flatter and
has lower R2 in North American sports leagues
compared with European soccer, and attribute this
weaker relationship to the various product and
labour market interventions applied in North
American sports. In North America, restrictions on
free agency and binding salary caps mean that, for
some players, pay is below marginal revenue product
(Krautmann, 1999). The relative weakness of the
player payroll–performance relationship in North
America has prompted Berri et al. (2006) to suggest
that omitted variable bias might be a problem and
the analysis of European soccer is by no means
exempt from this criticism.
One variable hitherto omitted from studies of the
relationship between team payrolls and team perfor-
mance in sports leagues is a measure of coaching
input. Folklore from within European soccer sug-
gests that performance of head coaches matters for
team performance, primarily through organizational
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and motivational ability. The most successful head
coach in our sample is Otmar Hitzfeld, who obtained
considerable success at Borussia Dortmund and
Bayern Muenchen, leading these teams to a total of
six domestic championship titles and each to a
Champions’ League trophy. Not surprisingly Hitz-
feld had the highest relative salary in each season
during his most recent spell with Bayern Muenchen.
It would be surprising if coaches lacked any
capability to affect team outcomes; indeed, if this
were so then players would simply turn up on sports
fields and organize themselves.
We have at our disposal data not just on
measures that serve as proxies for head coach
performance and ability but also on head coach
salaries in the top Bundesliga division, over a 22-
year period. The availability of coach salary data
enables us to pose the central question of whether
the market for head coaches is allocatively efficient.
Previous studies of impacts of measures of coach
ability and performance have focussed on techni-
cal efficiency of sports teams and have been
unable, through lack of data, to pursue the deeper
question of market efficiency.
We can pose the fundamental question of
whether or to what extent the salaries of head
coaches match the performances of the organiza-
tions for which they work. Soccer head coaches
have roles that resemble that of CEOs. They
propose hiring and firing decisions to the board of
directors (most often through a Director of Foot-
ball) and they impose team playing strategies and
make tactical adjustments within games. Head
coaches have important motivational roles to try
to raise individual player and team performance.
Coaches take credit from fans and media when
results are good, i.e. the team wins games, but also
take blame when games are lost. A long sequence
of poor results tends to lead to head coach
dismissal and, unlike conventional businesses,
results are posted each weekend during the season.
Hence, for soccer coaches, problems of hidden
action are likely to be less important than in other
businesses (Dawson and Dobson, 2002).
A considerable literature has developed on the
relationship between organizational performance
and managerial compensation, mostly with causality
from performance to pay (see, e.g. Conyon and
Murphy, 2000 for US and UK and Kraft and
Niederprum, 1999 for Germany). The reverse
relationship between managerial quality and organi-
zational performance has received far less attention.
This is not surprising. The data requirements needed
to properly separate out substitutability and com-
plementarity among the host of inputs to firm
outputs in complex, modern organizations are
usually too great to overcome and the risk of
omitted variable bias is bound to be high. Moreover,
a simple relationship between CEO pay and
organizational performance does not hold where
managers are awarded substantial stock options.
These have been introduced both in Europe and
North America in order to link managerial compen-
sation to particular organizational performance
measures and resolve principal-agent problems such
as managerial shirking. In European soccer, head
coaches are rarely rewarded by stock options as most
clubs are not publicly quoted. Hence, the relationship
between managerial pay and team performance
should emerge more cleanly for European soccer.
As Kahn (2000) has persuasively argued, the
sports industry is a useful sector within which to
test interesting hypotheses in the area of personnel
economics. In professional team sports, organiza-
tional goals and outcomes are much clearer than in
most other sectors. Teams usually wish to max-
imize sporting performance given available re-
sources with which to acquire playing and
managerial talent. Increased sporting performance
usually translates into higher revenues and profits
for team owners. In North American team sports
in particular, there exists a plethora of individual
performance and salary data often publicly avail-
able on the internet. In Europe, where soccer is
easily the dominant team sport, such data have
more restricted availability but nevertheless inter-
esting research can still be done.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.
In the second section, we review our data and
estimation methods. We first model a deterministic
production function and then move on to propose
a superior stochastic frontier estimation method.
The third section displays our preferred stochastic
frontier results while the fourth section proceeds to
discuss the implications for allocative inefficiency
in the market for head coaches. The fifth section
concludes.
DATA
Our data come from a Sunday newspaper (Die
Welt) that publishes team wage bills and head
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coach salaries immediately before the start of a
season. These data span 22 seasons of Bundesliga
1 from the 19th (1981/82) through to the 40th
season (2002/03). Supplementary data on team
playing records were obtained from Kicker soccer
magazine. With the single exception of 1991/92,
Bundesliga 1 contains 18 teams.1 Since 1992/93, at
the end of each season the three lowest placed
teams are demoted and replaced by the three
highest placed teams from the second tier,
Bundesliga 2.2 One particularly notable structural
change in German soccer is the change in the
number of points awarded for a win from two to
three installed in 1995/96 largely as an incentive to
encourage more attacking, entertaining play. Our
team performance measure is log of points divided
by maximum in any season. We have two
possibilities for treatment of team points covering
the regime change. One is to introduce a dummy
variable to indicate the newer three points for win
measure. However, this procedure would incorpo-
rate two things: the new points method and the
potential for incentives for a more attacking
playing strategy. We shall follow the alternative
method of converting all seasons to a common
point system with two points for a win through-
out. We can then use the dummy variable for
change in points system to test for possible impacts
of changes in playing strategy, which might follow
from increased incentives to attack with three
points for a win rather than two.
Data were collected for team points (as propor-
tion of maximum attainable in a given season),
team wage bill, coach salary, coach career points
from Bundesliga games as proportion of max-
imum possible, number of Bundesliga seasons
experienced by coaches, length of tenure in
Bundesliga 1 since 1981/82 or most recent promo-
tion (SPELL) and whether or not the team fired its
head coach during the season in question. These
data give us an unbalanced panel of 398 team–
season observations featuring 39 clubs. Six of these
(Bayern Muenchen, Werder Bremen, Borussia
Dortmund, Hamburger Sportverein, Bayer Lever-
kusen and VfB Stuttgart) have appeared in
Bundesliga 1 over the entire sample period and
have a maximum tenure value of 22; five clubs
(Blau-Weiss Berlin, Darmstadt 98, VfB Leipzig,
Kickers Offenbach and SSV Ulm) were relegated
after just one season. Descriptive statistics for
continuous variables are reported in Table 1.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Deterministic Frontier Estimation
We begin by estimating a simple ordinary least-
squares (OLS) production function, with team-
relative wage bill (LOG-RELATIVE WAGE
BILL) as the sole input and with team fixed
effects. The team payroll for each team is deflated
by the Bundesliga 1 average for that season to
control for payroll inflation over the sample
period. The results in Table 2 show diminishing
returns to player wage bill, with a payroll-points
elasticity of 0.2. When the coach-relative salary,
LOG-RELATIVE COACH SALARY, is included,
its coefficient is only marginally significant (p-
value ¼ 0:06) and hence the fit of the equation is
only slightly improved. The elasticity of points
with respect to salary for coaches is a modest 0.06
and is much less than the team payroll elasticity.3
Hence, it cannot be argued that team payrolls and
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Bundesliga Teams: 1981/82–2002/03 ðn ¼ 398Þ
Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Team inputs
Relative wage bill 1.000 0.533 0.230 4.147
Relative coach salary 1.000 0.507 0.226 3.079
Head coach measures
Coach career points ratio 0.435 0.215 0 0.850
Coach career experience 4.37 4.82 0 27
Team measures
Spell 7.17 6.06 1 22
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head coach salaries are close substitutes in
production of team performance.
However, the deterministic model may be
misspecified as it assumes full efficiency. More
precisely, random departures from the frontier are
attributed to stochastic elements (‘luck’) and not
inefficiency. Stochastic frontier models offer the
potential to separate departures from the frontier
due to random factors from departures due to
inefficiency.
Stochastic Frontier Estimation
Following Battese and Coelli (1995), a log-linear
Cobb–Douglas production function for a set of
firms indexed by i over a number of periods t can
be represented as
Yit ¼ xitbþ ðvit  uitÞ;
i ¼ 1; . . . ;N; t ¼ 1; . . . ;T ; ð1Þ
where Yit is the natural log of output, xit is a vector
of inputs, also in logs and b is a coefficient vector
to be estimated.4 The remainder of the equation is
an error term comprising two parts. vit is a random
error term with standard i.i.d properties. uit is a
non-negative random error term, also i.i.d but
further assumed to follow a normal distribution
truncated at zero; this last term captures potential
inefficiencies in production. If these are found to
be zero in estimation then we can revert to
standard econometric procedures to estimate a
production function with panel data, as in Table 1.
However, if these inefficiencies are found to be
significantly different from zero then production
function estimates that assume efficiency could
well be biased.
A number of papers have applied stochastic
frontier methods to various sports. The majority
of studies are concerned with the efficiency by
which teams translate inputs into outputs and very
few studies use pecuniary measures to proxy inputs
(see Dawson et al., 2000a; Kahane, 2005 for
notable exceptions).
The estimated technical inefficiency terms could
themselves be correlated with a further set of
explanatory variables. Ignoring this interdepen-
dence could lead to biased estimates. The model-
ling of technical inefficiencies was explored by
Battese and Coelli (1995). Studies from profes-
sional sports that follow this two-stage approach
include Dawson et al. (2000a,b), Kahane (2005)
and Hofler and Payne (2006). Assume that uit has
a distribution truncated at zero and given by 
Nðmit;s2uÞ: Mean inefficiency can be modelled as a
function of specific firm-level influences by
mit ¼ zitdþ wit; ð2Þ
where zit is a vector of firm-specific influences on
inefficiency in firm i in period t and d is another
vector of coefficients to be estimated. The error
term wit is assumed to be  Nð0; s2wÞ truncated at
zitd for consistency with the assumption that uit
is non-negative and truncated at zero.
In the second stage of the model, we have
five covariates. Most fundamentally, we follow
Kahane (2005) in removing coaching inputs
to the technical efficiency part of the model. The
simple reason for this is that coaches do not
directly produce output. In any case, we do
not observe coaching inputs directly, just the
monetary reward for coaching effort. Our view
is that coaches enhance efficiency by facilitating
the production of the players who produce points
for their teams.
Two additional measures reflecting managerial
ability that might conceivably impact on technical
inefficiency are coach experience (number of
seasons experience as head coach in the Bundesli-
ga, COACH EXPERIENCE) and coaching win–
loss records (proportion of possible points earned
as head coach, COACH POINTS RATIO). These
measures would be predicted to reduce technical
efficiency as they are increased. This is largely due
to selection and sorting; the least efficient man-
agers are likely to be identified through their poor
performance, given the playing resources available
to them, and consequently fired.5 However, in a
competitive market neither of these two variables
should have significant coefficients as experience
and win records ought to be fully incorporated in
coach salaries. Significance of either variable is
Table 2. OLS Frontier Estimation of a Cobb–
Douglas Production Function for Bunde-
sliga 1
Variable (1) (2)
Log-relative wage bill 0.200 (5.94) 0.175 (4.87)
Log-relative coach salary 0.057 (1.89)
R2 (within) 0.09 0.10
R2 (overall) 0.37 0.38
Note: absolute t-statistics in parentheses; team fixed effects
included. Dependent variable is log points ratio.
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then the evidence of allocative inefficiency in the
market for head coaches.6
Teams that are promoted may, even
allowing for lower wage bills, struggle to compete
effectively in the top tier of soccer as they adjust to
new playing surroundings, new teams and different
playing styles and strategies at the higher level.
We might predict that promoted teams face a
learning curve as they adjust to the higher level
of soccer. Learning effects are incorporated
by the variable SPELL, which is the number of
seasons in Bundesliga 1 that have accrued
since last promotion. Therefore, a team
like Bayern Muenchen which has never been
demoted has a value of SPELL that is equal
to the number of seasons it has spent in Bundesliga
1 since 1981/82. A team such as SSV Ulm which
only has one season in Bundesliga 1 has a spell
value of 1.
Managerial turnover in European soccer is
rather frequent. In our sample, single-case head
coach dismissals occur in a total of 141 out of 398
team–season observations.7 A team that fires its
head coach during the season is denoted by the
dummy variable DISMISS. The underlying rea-
sons for coach dismissal are not explored here,
although poor team performance is the usual
proximate cause. All we seek to capture is the
unsettling impact of head coach departure on team
organization and morale through team inefficien-
cies. We predict that head coach dismissals will be
associated with increased team inefficiency speci-
fically as a current season impact.8
Equations (1) and (2) can be estimated using the
maximum likelihood method proposed by Battese
and Coelli (1993) and made available in Coelli’s
(1996) computer program FRONTIER 4.1 or in
STATA. The maximized log-likelihood function
gives estimates of s2 and g where s2 ¼ s2v þ s
2
u and
g ¼ su=ðs2v þ s
2
uÞ: The g parameter is particularly
important as it shows the proportion of the sum of
the two error variances that is accounted by
technical inefficiencies. If this parameter is not
significantly different from zero then we cannot
reject the null hypothesis of zero technical
inefficiencies and we would revert to standard
panel data econometric procedures to estimate our
conventional team production function.
Table 3 reports stochastic frontier estimates.
Our dependent variable is again log points ratio
and the production function has a Cobb–Douglas
form.9 The coefficient g is positive and significant
at the 1% level. Hence, team inefficiencies are
important in explaining variations in points ratios
and we therefore reject estimation of a standard
production frontier in favour of a stochastic
frontier model. A further consideration is whether
the inefficiency terms are time varying or time
independent. Dawson et al. (2000a,b) found
evidence of time-varying inefficiency in their
studies of English soccer, but the specific version
of exponentially decaying technical inefficiency
terms over time was rejected for the Bundesliga
1, with the critical parameter Z not significantly
different from zero.
The elasticity of points ratio with respect to
relative wage bill is now 0.23, significant at the 1%
level, suggesting strongly diminishing returns.
Acquiring a better quality head coach, with a
higher relative salary, has the beneficial effect of
reducing team inefficiency. This is shown in the
sign and value of the parameter d1: In addition, the
significant d2 parameter shows that for given
relative coach salary, a head coach with greater
managerial win record is also associated
with reduced inefficiency. However, the d para-
meter on coaching experience was insignificant
(t-statistic ¼ 1:18) and was dropped from the
analysis. It seems that experience of winning
dominates experience per se as a key managerial
Table 3. Stochastic Frontier Estimation of a





Log-relative wage bill b1 0.225 (9.81)
Intercept b0 0:465 (10.92)
Head coach measures
Log-relative coach salary d1 0:084 (2.09)
Career points ratio d2 0:186 (2.63)
Team level
Spell d3 0:011 (2.92)
Dismiss d4 0.296 (4.83)
Inefficiency model intercept d0 0.185 (1.94)
Variance parameters
Total error variance s2 0.041 (19.55)
Proportion of error variance due
to technical inefficiencies
g 0.730 (2.27)
Mean technical efficiency 0.791
Log likelihood 153.7
Dependent variable is log points ratio.
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characteristic that helps improve technical effi-
ciency and move the team towards its potential
output.
The other d parameters are all statistically
significant at the 1% level. The significantly negative
d3 parameter on SPELL shows that a team that has
enjoyed a longer continuous spell in Bundesliga 1
than a rival will, ceteris paribus, enjoy reduced
inefficiency. This possibly reflects a cumulative
learning experience for clubs with prolonged tenure
in the top division of German soccer. In contrast,
recently promoted clubs have smaller values of
SPELL and hence greater inefficiency scores.
A team that fires its head coach in a season will
suffer increased technical inefficiency. Given the
turbulence that usually surrounds a head
coach departure this is to be expected, although
the departure may itself reflect some underlying
problems such as loss of customer (fan) support,
financial failure and lack of co-operation between
team-mates. This does not imply that firing head
coaches is irrational as teams may believe that
long-term gains (by acquiring a better head coach)
will outweigh short-term losses of efficiency.
The stochastic frontier estimates, therefore,
reveal an important role for head coach quality
in moving teams closer to their production
frontiers, where coach salary is taken to be a
proxy for coaching ability and performance.
However, the result that coaches with greater
prior win records can also reduce technical
inefficiency, even controlling for coach salary is
indicative of underpayment for coaches. In a
competitive market, coach win records should be
fully incorporated into coach salaries and the d2
parameter on COACH POINTS RATIO should
be insignificantly different from zero.
We can see whether coach win records are fully
captured by coach salary by estimating a simple
regression of log-relative salary with log-relative
wage bill, coach experience and coach win record
as covariates. Head coach fixed effects are
included. The estimates, with t statistics in
parentheses, are shown below
We find that coach experience is a significant
predictor of relative head coach salary.
This is consistent with sorting and matching
in the market for head coaches. However,
the coach performance measure, career
points ratio, is not a significant predictor of
head coach salary. To counter the objection
that coach win ratio might be fully captured
by coach experience we see that the correla-
tion coefficient between these two variables
is only 0.45. We interpret these regression
results as supporting evidence of allocative
inefficiency in the market for Bundesliga head
coaches.
DISCUSSION
What explanations can be offered for this
apparent allocative inefficiency in the market for
German head coaches? First, unlike players, the
overwhelming majority of Bundesliga 1 head
coaches is of German nationality. As at
2006, there were only two (out of 18) non-German
coaches working in Bundesliga 1 (Van Marwijk
(Dutch) at Dortmund and Koller (Swiss)
at Bochum). Second, German head coaches
rarely move abroad, again unlike players.
Thus, Bundesliga 1 head coaches lack mobility
and do not enforce outside options when negotiat-
ing salary levels. Third, most German teams insist
on hiring only those coaches who have acquired a
diploma from the German Sports University
located in Cologne. Fourth, Bundesliga coaches
who are fired have a high probability of finding a
similar position at another club, largely because
teams are seemingly reluctant to hire non-Ger-
mans.10 Weak Bundesliga coaches are then
shielded from competition. All in all, these
restrictions combine to deliver some monopsony
power for Bundesliga 1 teams that contrasts















Coach points ratio; R2 ðoverallÞ ¼ 0:43:
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CONCLUSIONS
From stochastic frontier modelling, we find
that relative spending on playing talent and
on head coach talent combine effectively to
reduce technical efficiency and improve league
performance. The literature on personnel econom-
ics would benefit from further examination of such
complementarities in other settings.
Our modelling exercise in this paper
produces several key results. First, the stochastic
frontier estimates showed that extra spending
on managerial talent vested in a head coach
has the impact of moving teams closer to the
points ratio-relative wage bill frontier. If a more
successful coach can be hired, as indicated by a
higher career points ratio, then we find that the
team’s technical inefficiency is reduced, even after
controlling for coach salary. Technical inefficiency
is not lowered by hiring a more experienced
head coach as this is already captured fully
by coach salary. Our interpretation of the sig-
nificance of coach win records is that coaches
are underpaid in the German head coach market.
The rationale offered for this finding is lack
of mobility of German head coaches on the
supply side, with preferences for positions
in the Bundesliga rather than outside Germany,
reinforced by the implicit requirement of clubs
that coaches must have a diploma from
an accredited German Sports University.
This operates as a barrier of entry to foreign-born
coaches.
Our principal finding of allocative inefficiency
in the market for Bundesliga head coaches
comes from a stochastic frontier approach
normally used purely to reveal, and determine
causes of, technical inefficiency. The use
of an analysis of technical inefficiency to form
inferences about allocative inefficiency is, as far as
we are aware, novel and we recommend that such
an approach be extended to other cases in
personnel economics so as to explore interactions
between technical inefficiency and executive com-
pensation.
Acknowledgements
We are grateful to an anonymous referee, Geraint Johnes, Leo
Kahane and audiences at Department of Economics, University
of Oviedo, Institute of Strategy and Business Economics,
University of Zurich and Western Economic Association, San
Francisco for their helpful comments.
NOTES
1. In 1991/92, following unification of East and West
Germany, the top two teams from the first division of
the former German Democratic Republic were
admitted to Bundesliga 1 and the number of teams
was temporarily increased to 20. At the end of the
1991/92 season, four teams were relegated to
Bundesliga 2 while only two were promoted, restor-
ing the traditional league size of 18.
2. Prior to 1991/92, a two game playoff between the
team placed 16th in Bundesliga and the team placed
third in Bundesliga 2 settled, by aggregate score, one
of the places in Bundesliga 1 for the subsequent
season.
3. A translog specification was also estimated but
comprehensively rejected in favour of Cobb–Dou-
glas; squared and cross-product terms each had t-
statistic of value less than 1.
4. Again, we also estimated a more flexible translog
functional form and, as with the OLS model in
Table 1, found that this was rejected in favour of
Cobb–Douglas.
5. We should stress that it is technical inefficiency rather
than absolute level of performance which is the key
variable in the second stage of our model. Absolute
ability should be reflected in the head coach’s salary.
A head coach can be associated with a low level of
performance yet be highly technically efficient ac-
cording to our econometric evidence. Conversely, a
head coach could be associated with a high level of
performance yet be technically inefficient. In the
former case, a coach is highly likely to be fired due to
director and fan (mis)perception of incompetence. In
the latter case, the head coach might receive an
unduly high level of praise.
6. There is an analogy with Szymanski’s (2000) treat-
ment of racial discrimination in English football.
Szymanski estimated a deterministic production
function with team-relative payroll (including both
player salaries and coach salaries within an aggregate
measure). He then added the relative number of black
players on teams as an additional variable and found
a significant coefficient. In a competitive market for
players, this coefficient should be zero. Similarly,
Kahane’s (2005) study of hockey found that teams
that hired more French–Canadians exhibited greater
inefficiency, controlling for player wage bill as a
determinant of the production frontier.
7. It should be stressed that these are dismissals and not
voluntary quits.
8. In dismissing a head coach during the season a team
could have two views on the likely gains. One short-
term view is that the change in head coach is a quick
fix which can quickly restore life to an ailing team.
Game-level empirical evidence from European soccer
suggests only limited short-term improvement in
match results (e.g. Bruinshoofd and ter Weel, 2003;
Ko¨ning, 2003 on Dutch soccer). Alternatively, teams
may take a longer view and assess that a new head
coach can bring better performance in the future even
though current performance may be disappointing.
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A team may be judged to be already condemned to
relegation due to poor performance under a dis-
missed head coach and fortunes may be judged to
improve eventually under a new appointment.
9. The more flexible translog form was again tested and
rejected due to jointly insignificant coefficients on
squared and cross-product terms.
10. Dawson and Dobson (2002) analyse the remarkable
propensity of fired coaches in English football to be
re-hired by other English clubs.
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